Joy Ann Lewis v Calvin James
| Jurisdiction | British Virgin Islands |
| Judge | Ellis J |
| Judgment Date | 03 April 2019 |
| Neutral Citation | VG 2019 HC 20 |
| Court | High Court (British Virgin Islands) |
| Docket Number | Claim No. BVIHCV 2015/0259 |
| Date | 03 April 2019 |
EASTERN CARIBBEAN SUPREME COURT
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
Ellis J
Claim No. BVIHCV 2015/0259
Ms. Ruthilia Maximea, Counsel for the Claimant/Appellant
Ms. Elizabeth Ryan, Counsel for the Defendant/Respondent
Contract Law - Claim for the breach of promise to marry — Mutual exchange of promises by the parties to marry each other-Offer and acceptance of the promise — Whether the contract to marry was free from fraud — Whether one of the defendant failed or refused to honour the obligation — Whether the claimant suffer some form of injury, loss or damage.
Property Law — Whether the claimant established on a balance of probabilities that she had an interest in the property by way of constructive trust and or proprietary estoppel — Express agreement — Contribution to the acquisition — Whether the Claimant acted to her detriment.
In this Claim Joy Ann Lewis (“ the Claimant”) seeks the following relief against Calvin James (“ the Defendant”):
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i. A declaration that she has a legal and beneficial interest in the land and or all edifices erected on property located in Sage Mountain more particularly described as Block 2536B Parcel 126 (“ the Property”).
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ii. A declaration that the Defendant holds the legal and beneficial interest of the Claimant whether by reason of constructive trusts or proprietary estoppel.
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iii. An order that her interest be determined and valued.
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iv. Damages for breach of a marital agreement concluded on 25 th December 2009.
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v. Costs.
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vi. Further and other relief as the Court deems just.
It is common ground that the Parties were involved in an intimate relationship between 2002 and 2014. In or around 2004, the Defendant moved into the Claimant's apartment at Sophie Bay. At all material times the Claimant was employed at a local eating establishment and the Defendant was employed as a Police Officer. It is not disputed that the Defendant earned significantly more than the Claimant. However, when the Defendant moved in, it was agreed that the Claimant would pay the rent while the Defendant would contribute to the cost of utilities and food.
The Parties continued to reside together at the Sophie Bay apartment until the completion of the residence on the Property. During this time, the Defendant opened an account at the National Bank. He later added the Claimant's name to that account. The said account was used jointly by the Parties, but the Defendant contends that it was never associated with the mortgage payments or the development of the Property.
The Claimant asserts that she was financially independent when she met the Defendant. However after the Defendant moved in with her at Sophie Bay she asserts that they pooled their resources together and the Defendant was largely able to purchase the Property because she continued to pay the rent in full while he contributed towards food and utility bills enabling him to save towards the purchase of the Property. This contention was trenchantly disputed by the Defendant who denied that the fact that Claimant continued to pay the rent to her apartment enabled him to purchase or develop the Property. Instead, he argued that it is the Claimant who benefitted from their cohabitation because he significantly assisted with her household expenses.
In or about April 2007, the Defendant solely purchased the Property. The Defendant contends that he purchased the land exclusively with his personal savings and with the proceeds of loans obtained from local lending institutions. The Defendant states that he obtained a further loan by the National Bank of the Virgin Islands in order to construct the improvements on the land and between December 2008 and January 2009, the Defendant solely completed construction of the ground floor of the building. Eventually, the Defendant applied for and was successful in obtaining a further loan which refinanced the mortgage on the Property.
By 2011, the building on the Property consisted of two 2-bedroom self-contained apartments, one 1-bedroom self-contained apartment and a cistern. The Parties took up residence in one of the 2-bedroom apartments and they leased the others. The rent generated was used to pay the mortgage for the Property. The Claimant claims that they agreed to a new arrangement to manage of the household finances — the Defendant would supplement the monthly mortgage payments and the Claimant would attend to the household bills. In order to meet these obligations, the Claimant states that she undertook additional part time employment as a baby sitter as well as participated in a “partner hand”.
Eventually, the relationship between the Parties began to breakdown and in December 2013, the Defendant served the Claimant with a Notice to Quit. A second Notice to Quit was later served to quit the property by July 2015. On September 2015, after the expiration of the second Notice to Quit, the Defendant refused to allow the Claimant to re-enter the Property unless a police officer accompanied her to collect her personal belongings. The Claimant was only able to remove her personal belongings from the Sage Mountain Property pursuant to an order of the Court dated 15 th October 2015.
The Claimant asserts that as a result of this summary eviction, she suffered distress, humiliation and hurt feelings.
In a collateral claim, the Claimant also contends that on 25 th December 2009, the Defendant proposed marriage to her. She states that she accepted this offer and they both continued to work towards the completion of the Property eventually procuring furnishings and fixtures for the same. By this Claim, the Claimant also seeks damages for the Defendant's purported breach of this promise to marry when he evicted her from their home and terminated their relationship.
The Claimant's claim for the breach of contract of promise to marry was dismissed by the Court directly after the conclusion of the trial. At that time, the Court promised brief written reasons which are set out below.
This cause of action was abolished in the United Kingdom with the passage of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1970, section 1(1) of which provides that:
“[a]n agreement between two persons to marry one another shall not under the law of England and Wales have effect as a contract giving rise to legal rights and not action shall be brought in England and Wales for breach of such an agreement, whatever the law applicable to such an agreement”.
However, this statute was not been received into the laws of this Territory and so under the law of the Virgin Islands, there remains the right of an individual to sue for breach of promise to marry. This right is said to be a common law hybrid of tort and contract. The elements of this cause of action are predicated on contract principles with the exception of the question of damages which is rooted in tort.
First, the promise to marry contract comes into existence by the mutual exchange of promises by the parties to marry each other. A mere convivial or romantic relationship is not enough for a court to found an agreement to marry. An offer and acceptance of the promise must be proven in order for an action to lie. In addition, the contract to marry must be free from fraud. Second, it must be shown that one party to the agreement, whether the man or the woman, has failed or refused to honour the obligation. Finally, when the contract to marry has been breached, the injured party must suffer some form of injury, loss or damage.
Any action or conduct which directly suggests a promise would constitute evidence and therefore proof of promise to marry. The Court considered the totality of the evidence advanced by the Claimant in support of this claim and the Court was not satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the Claimant has proven that Defendant made an offer of marriage which was accepted by her. It is clear that over the course of the Parties' relationship, the Defendant had made several generous gifts of jewelry to the Claimant (at least 2 rings which according to the witness, Izine Jeffers she would wear on her wedding finger) which did not involve a marriage proposal. A purchase of a ring at Christmas time therefore could not without more provide sufficient proof of a promise to marry.
The Court considered the evidence of the several witnesses in this case. To the extent that they address this aspect of the Claim, it is clear that they all recount conversations and impressions and perceptions which were conveyed to them by the Claimant only and not the Defendant. The Court has taken into account the evidence of Izine Jeffers that during a cruise vacation in 2009, the Defendant told her he was going to purchase an engagement ring for the Claimant. However, in the absence of cogent corroborative evidence of an actual proposal or offer of marriage this expression of an intention alone could not tip the balance of probability.
In fact, none of the witnesses advanced by the Claimant, including Izine Jeffers actually witnessed the marriage proposal and despite the Claimant's claim that over the course of their relationship the Defendant introduced her to various persons as his fiancée, no witness was produced who could actually recount a personal interaction with the Defendant in which he confirmed that he had in fact proposed marriage on 25 th December 2009. Instead, the Court had to grapple with evidence of the Claimant's own witness, Melvin Jeffers who testified that prior to her being excluded from the residence; he was unaware that the Parties were engaged. Moreover, the Court also had to grapple with the persuasive testimony of the Defendant's witnesses Edwin Edwards and David James who, despite their closeness to the Defendant,...
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